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PRICING POLICY AND THE DISAPPEARING FARMERS' 
INCOME IN UGANDA'S COTTON INDUSTRY 
By 
George Alibaruho 
WORKING PAPER NO. 176 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effect pricing policies pursued 
by the Lint Marketing Board have had on the level and stability 
of cotton farmers' income over time. First, an accounting of the 
disbursment of total realised export income is used as the basis 
for determining the extent to which marketing board pricing has 
depressed and stabilised producer incomes. Secondly, supply 
elasticity analysis is incorporated in the model to measure the 
possible full magnitude of the income effect of pricing policy. 
Then, the income stabilisation role of the board is retested. 
The paper concludes that farmers have faced a two 
stage robbery machinery; firstly through the direct reduction 
in potentially realisable income with no adjustment in supply and 
secondly, through the inevitable upward supply adjustment if 
producer prices were anywhere close to export prices. With either 
approach, however, the board seems to have lessened the potential 
instability of producers' income. 
INTRODUCTION 
The welfare of farmers must be one of the principle 
ultimate goals of any pricing and marketing policy. Although the 
concept of welfare is not very well defined analytically, we can 
nevertheless say that the welfare of farmers would be affected by 
the extent to which marketing and pricing policy affects the level 
as well as the stability of farmers' income. In th% context of this 
paper, the income referred to is aggregate sectoral income of the 
cotton farmers derived from the production and sale of cotton. If 
policy is so designed as to facilitate the realisation of all 
potential income by cotton farmers, clearly, such policy would be 
boosting the purchasing power and welfare of these farmers. The 
converse is also true. If policy is so designed as to minimise the 
instability of these farmers' incomes, then such policy would be 
minimising the risks associated with the uncertainitv of variable 
income. We can infer, therefore, that such policy would again 
boost farmers' welfare. Conversely, a policy that accentuates the 
instability of farmers' incomes would depress their welfare. It is 
in this context that this paper will use two distinct approaches 
to assess the direction in which Marketing Board pricing policy 
has affected the welfare of cotton farmers as well as the magnitude 
of this effect. 
The simple and common way of assessing the effect 
of a marketing board on the level and stability of producer 
incomes is to utilize an accounting of the disbursement of total 
export income received by the Board. This methodology entails a 
comparative anaJ.ysis of observed producer income and observed 
export income without reference to supply analysis. It underlies 
the existing studies of the income stabilizing role of marketing 
boards.- We shall label this methodology "the Accounting Approach". 
On the other hand, in this paper, we-shall integrate the price 
theory of resource allocation, supply analysis and output effect 
in providing an alternative and in my view a better measure of the 
effect of marketing board policy on the level and stability of 
farmers' income. We shall label this methodology "the Analytical 
Approach". 
Income Effect of Marketing Policy: The Accounting Approach 
In the case of Uganda cotton, an accounting of the 
disbursement of total export income is provided in the Annual 
Trading Account presented in the Board's Annual Reports. There 
are six items on this account detailing the disposal of total reported 
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export receipts. These items are shown m Table 1. They represent 
the share of growers, the government and marketing middlemen in 
reported export revenue. 
Item (1) shows growers' incomes from each year's crop. 
This figure is obtained bv multiplying producer prices with total 
output for each season. Item (2) shows the middlemen's income: 
item (3) shows the cost to the Marketing Board of transportation 
and insurance of the cotton up to Mombasa entreport port together 
with port handling charges. Item ('4) shows the local governments' 
share of the revenue, while item (5) shows the Central Government's 
share. Item (6) shows the Lint Marketing Board's net retained 
surplus (deficit) of the export revenue. (It is these annual 
surpluses that formed the Price Assistance Fund.) The figure 
in item (7) (Total Income) is based on the reported quantity 
of cotton sold:(exported and sold to the local mills) and F.O.R. 
Kampala prices (free on rail). 
In Table 1, producers' income as a percentage of 
export income is shown to range from 36.0% to 84.0%. As this per-
centage approaches 84% one would say that farmers are steadily getting 
a fair deal for their effort. Yet this statistic is very deceptive. 
If one compares the percentage producer prices are of export c.i.f. 
prices (See 2, p.14) with this static, one has to believe that 
these percentages (item 8, table 1) are grossly overstated. 
Firstly, even if the F.O.R. Kampala prices used by the board in 
arriving at export income (item 7, table 1) are adjusted upwards 
for freight charges to Mombasa and c.i.f. charges between Mombasa 
and the ports of import, the percentages in table 1 overstate the 
share of farmers' income in total export income in three important 
respects.' Firstly, production in any one year is not always equal 
to sales. This is true because the Board holds and carries stocks 
between any two or more periods. This fact has the effect of over-
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stating producers' income and understating the Board's income. 
Its net effect would be to overstate producers' income as a 
percentage of expert income. Secondly, some cotton is purchased 
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from growers but "stolen" before the Board exports it. This also 
would have the same effect of overstating the share of producers' 
income. Thirdly, in the quotation of price by the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee (c.i.f.) and the Lint Marketing Board 
(F.O.R.) there seems to be such a gap that unless it is all explained 
by Kampala-Mombasa freight charges and c.i.f. Mombasa-overseas 
charges, there seems to be what Bauer would call an "underrealization" L). 
factor m the realized export price of Uganda cotton. If this 
is true, then this factor does also cause an understatement of 
export revenue. This would tend to overstate the share of 
farmers' income. Therefore item 8, Table lis not the correct 
representation of the share of farmers' remuneration in the earnings 
of their cotton. 
Marketing Board's Stabilizing Effect on Producers' Income: The 
Accounting Approach 
In testing for the income stabilizing role of marketing 
policy, the Board's export income series and observed producer 
income series of Table 1 are considered as two samples. The 
instability index computed will be the average annual percentage 
deviation of the respective observations in each sample from a 
five year centered moving average — the trend.^ 
'Table 2 shows the data on actual cotton producers' 
income under Lint Marketing Board trading and the computed 
instability index. Table 3 shows the Board's export income for 
the same period and the corresponding .instability. The average 
P 
instability of actual producer income is 10.9% (I =10.9 in Table 
2) as opposed to an instability of Marketing Board export income 
(Table 3) which is 16.3%. This suggests that the board has 
absorbed 33.1% of the total magnitude of income instability. 
This result very well corroborates the results of previous 
researchers on this subject in Uganda^ 
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Income Effect of Marketing Policy: An Analytical Approach 
An accounting of the disbursement of export revenue is 
an unsatisfactory way of assessing the income effect of the 
Marketing Board's interference in the cotton industry. Because it 
does not embody any supply theory, it understates the income effect. 
A more satisfactory approach should integrate resource allocation, 
supply response and output effect analysis in the measure of 
total income effect of pricing policy. 
Income effect will be defined as the potential change 
in income of cotton farmers had they obtained export prices for 
their cotton (rather than the producer prices fixed by the Lint 
Marketing Board) and adjusted their production plans in 
response to these higher prices. 
Denote this quantitv by AX ; t = 1945. 1946, — , 1966. If AO is t . 3 5 -t 
the output effect of the marketing Board's interference in the 
setting of price, then 
(1) AX = PC' (AQJ; t = 1945, 1946, — , 1966. t t t 
Where PC' is export price of cotton. With PC', known (see t ~ t 
table 4) in order to compute the AX series, we need an estimate 
of the AQ series. We can easily obtain these from an analysis 
of elasticity measures which we shall undertake presently. 
Supply Responsiveness and the Output Effect of the Board's 
Interference in Price Determination 
As long as supply elasticity is non zero, the Marketing 
Board's interference in the pricing mechanism will have an 
output effect via resource allocation, especially in the long run. 
If the deductions on unit export revenue in the form of export 
duty, marketing board surplus, marketing board operating costs etc. 
were not made, cotton producer prices would rise; though not by 
the full magnitude of these deductions as some marketing costs 
would still be incurred by any other alternative marketing arrangement. 
Such cost data for a hypothetical alternative marketing arrangement 
is not available and any attempt to devise them would be 
speculation. Therefore, we shall consider the full difference 
between producer price and export price as the "producer price effect" 
- 8 -
of the existing marketing arrangement. Since this "producer 
price effect" is negative (producer prices are lower than export 
prices), if the estimated supply elasticity is positive, then 
output effect will be negative. For the sake of completeness, we 
shall give further theoretical justification for the existence of 
a negative output effect by analysing the intermediate processes 
between producer price as a decision signal and observed output. 
The Resource Allocation Decision as a Prelude to Changes in 
Output 
Because of the relatively low use of capital, chemical 
fertilizer, sophisticated management etc., land and labor remain 
by far the most important factor inputs in Uganda's cotton 
industry. However, for analytical purposes, we shall accept 
that the cotton farmer is free to employ as many inputs as he 
feels it is economically prudent to utilise. 
Let V be a vector of i inputs, P a corresponding 
vector of i input prices, PC the producer price of cotton, PC' 
the export price of cotton and f the farmer's production function. 
A profit maximising farmer will utlise the vector V in such a way 
that 
(2) P. = PC.f. (V) for all i. 1 I 
From equation (1), the demand for the i-th input can be derived as 
a function of its own price and the producer pri.ce of cotton. The 
function possesses the following properties: 
(i) 8Vi < 0 for all i ; 
3P. l 
(ii) 3Vi > 0 for all i. 
"3TT 
From property (ii) of the input demand function, it follows 
that since PC't > PC for the entire sample period 1945 to 1966, 
the Marketing Board's interference in the cotton industry has led., 
to an underutilization of resources in that industry. This 
gives us the analytical justification for the negative outnut 
effect which we can now compute from long run elasticity 
8 measures. 
- 9 -
Computation of Output Effect from Supply Elasticity Measures 
Let Q be the total output of cotton in thousands 
of 400 lb. bales at time t; t = 1945, 1946, --, 1966. The Q 
series are the observed output associated with the higher potential 
producer price PC'^ (export price). Let e be the mean of the. 
estimated four long run regional supply elasticities. This 
g 
"average" long run supply elasticity is equal to 0.4412. From 
the elasticity definition, we derive the following expression 
for output effect: 
(3) AQ = e.Qt (PC - PC' ) 
~ p c : 
L 
The output effect, therefore, can be given by a computation of 
AQ for the 1945 - 1966 period. Since PC^ < PC' , the t L t 
AQ series will all be negative. t 
The ]j)ata data on producer prices, Export prices and output, 
See table 4. 
The Estimates 
The estimates of AQ^ in table 5 obviously over 
estimate the output effect because the export prices are c.i.f. 
prices and therefore include an element of freight charges (Kampala 
Ports of Import). Where as it is not possible that farmers 
could have realised export prices without incurring marketing and 
Distribution costs, nevertheless, the Board's non marketing cost 
levies that fall on farmer prices mean that had producer prices 
"tended" to export prices, output would have risen; the quantities 
shown in table 5 would be the limits of this additional production. 
Having obtained the AQ series, the computation of 
AX then becomes a matter of simple arithmetic. Estimates of 
AX^ which are all negative (due to the output effect of pricing 
policy being negative) are shown in table 6. 
Comparing Table 6 with item 9 of Table 1, it is 
evident that the methodology employed by previous studies 
grossly understates the income effect of the marketing board's 
activities (see 5 in particular). However, strictly speaking, 
from the point of view of the welfare of farmers, the income 
effect measured in Table 6 overstates the potential producers' 
- 10 -
Table 4 Output and Prices 
t 
Producer Price 
(PC) 
cts/lb. 
Export Price (c.i.f.) 
* (PC') 
cts/lb 
Output 
(Bales of 400 lbs) 
1950 33 270 339,000 
1951 45 416 346,000 
1952 50 403 380,000 
1953 50 300 320,000 
1954 51 304 309,000 
1955 61 308 300,000 
1956 55 298 364,000 
1957 56 305 372,000 
1958 58 260 351,000 
1959 47 258 401,000 
1960 48 272 360,000 
1961 55 258 371,000 
1962 57 n.a. n. a. 
1963 57 238 181,000 
1964 51 252 359,000 
1965 56 252 379,000 
1966 40 223 438,000 
1967 • 45 224 445,000 
Source: 1. Uganda. Ministry of Agriculture, Annual Reports, 1950, 
1967. Entebbe: The Government Printer 1950,.., 1967. 
2. Lint Marketing Board, Annual Reports, Kampala. 
TABLE 5 
ESTIMATED OUTPUT EFFECT OF THE MARKETING BOARD'S 
INTERFERENCE IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY (BALES OF 400 LBS.) 
1945 - 1966 
Year 
t 
AQ Year AQ • 
1950 -1,074,152 1956 -709,546 
1951 -1,258,557 1957 -729,776 
1952 -1,183,651 1958 -539,344 
1953 -705,920 1959 -794,263 
1954 -871,102 1960 -741,216 
1955 -535,950 1961 -604,147 
1962 - n. a. 
1963 -267,592 
1964 -502,960 
1965 -659,023 
1966 -676,360 
1967 -533,374 
- 12 -
TABLE 6 
MONEY INCOME EFFECT OF THE MARKETING BOARD 
INTERFERENCE IN UGANDA'S COTTON INDUSTRY1 
Millions of Shilln.ngs 
Year AX Year AX 
1950 -1,160 (-186) 1957 -890 (-164) 
1951 -2,094 (-378) 1958 -561 (-80) 
1952 -1,908 (-360) 1959 -820 (-86) 
1953 -847 (-128) 1960 -806 (-156) 
1954 -1,059 (-192) 1961 -623 (-128) 
1955 •660 (-140) 1962 n.a. n.a. 
1956 -846 (-166) 1963 -265 (-34) 
1964 -479 (-202) 
1965 -664 (-162) 
1966 . -682 (-134) 
1967 -476 ( -58) 
The figures are rounded to the nearest million to 
make them comparable with the income effect as measured by the 
traditional "Accounting Approach", which yielded the figures in 
table 1 (reproduced in parentheses here for easy contrast). 
- 13 -
gain from increased cotton export earnings. From this money 
income gain, we must subtract the value of the production opportunity 
cost to cotton farmers if they reallocated resources out of the 
production of non-cotton commodities to", the production of 
cotton. The closer to full employment the economy is, the more 
important this opportunity cost would be. 
Marketing Board's Stabilizing Effect on Cotton Farmers' Income 
P%evisited 
Using the Accounting Approach to the analysis of income 
effect of Marketing Board operation, we concluded that the 
Lint Marketing Board had absorbed 33.1% of the total instability 
of farmers' incomes. We shall now show on a chart (Fig 1) the income 
levels and income effects obtained under the two approaches 
and finally re-estimate the Marketing Board's income stabilizing 
role using the potential export income based on the estimated 
income effect shown in Table 
In Table 7, the full level of potential producer 
income is equal to actual farmers' income plus the modulus of 
the income effect. It exhibits an average annual percentage 
deviation from a five-year centered moving average of 17.8%. 
This instability index is greater than 15.3%, the instability index 
of observed export receipts estimated by the "Accounting Approach". 
Therefore, in totality, the Lint Marketing Board has stabilized 
producers' incomes more than would be indicated by the Accounting 
Approach that has been deployed in previous studies (see 5, 6 S 9) 
CONCLUSION 
By any standards, when producers receive total income 
sometimes as low as 36% of total export income, they are victims 
of robbery without violence. When you add the fact that had these 
farmers faced prices related to world market: prices they would 
have increased their output (table 5), then one can't help but 
conclude that the farmers have faced a two stage robbery system. 
From the analysis however, one reason for qualifying this 
conclusion is that if cotton output were to increase due to 
higher producer prices, the output of alternative crops 
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currently grown in the same area that grows cotton (including 
food crops) might have declined especially in Buganda where due 
to the high population density, there is little uncultivated land. 
Therefore the monetary opportunity cost of additional cotton 
output in the absence of the board would have to be deducted 
from the potential cotton income forgone by cotton farmers under 
the present marketing set up in order to arrive at a net result. 
A second reason for qualifying this conclusion relates to the 
use made of funds collected by the Board that would otherwise 
have accrued to the farmers. One clear thing is that the 
subsidisation of farmer prices (if any) has been minimal in the 
disposal of these funds. The more important outlets of these 
funds have been the board's investments in the stock of the 
Uganda Electricity Board (aParastatal, body) and direct transfers 
to the ministry of finance to subsidize the government's fiscal 
programs. It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a 
far reaching benefit-cost analysis of the use of these funds from 
the point of view of the farmers.. However, we know that the operations 
of the Uganda Electricity Board do not entail any rural electrification 
program so that the benefits of their activities to the farmers must 
be more indirect than anything else. In any case, it is 
deducible from this analysis that marketing board operation has 
accenturated the widening income gap between the Urban and rural 
sectors of the economy. 
Because of uncertainity, in trade, export instability 
has been generally considered as destructive to the development 
process especially in the so-called "export led", dependent 
developing economies. This view of the instability-growth 
relationship is nurtured by theoretical arguments firmly grounded 
in traditional macroeconomic theory and multiplier analysis and a 
conception of growth dynamics in which capital accumulation and 
especially imported capital goods and foreign exchange play a 
fundamental role (see 12) The same rationale underlies 
international and national efforts aimed at "ironing out" the 
instability factor in trade through appropriate commodity price 
stabilization and compensatory financing schemes. Stabilization 
schemes seem more imperative the smaller the range.of alternative 
export commodities in the economy. Such is the case with Uganda, 
- 17 -
whose export trade is dominated by coffee and cotton. The 
instability factor was a major consideration in the establishment 
of the Uganda Lint Marketing Board to "cushion" the cotton farmer 
from the undesirable effects of international commodity market 
fluctuations. 
From the stabilization point of views existing methodology 
for analyzing and testing income stabilizing effects of Marketing 
Bord policies has been inadequate. Instability of actual producer 
incomes is simply compared with instability of potential producer 
income, as measured by export receipts of the Boards. Implicit 
in this definition of potential producer income is the assumption 
that world market prices of cotton do not vary with the level of 
domestic output. It may be reasonable to assume that the elasticity 
of demand for many export commodities of small countries such as 
Uganda's cotton is infinite along the relevant range on the 
demand curve. But this definition also assumes that domestic 
production level is invariant with alternative producer prices, 
notwithstanding the empirical evidence to the contrary. It assumes 
a zero output effect of Marketing Board pricing policies. To the 
extent that this assumption is not true, (See 3 S 10) the 
instability measure of potential producer income deployed in 
existing literature has been misleading. We must, therefore, 
concede that the Lint Marketing Board in Uganda has stabilised 
farmers' incomes more than has been realised. 
- 18 -
FOOTNOTES 
1. See 5, 6 and 9. 
2. The word "reported" is used here to signify that export 
income as recorded in the Lint Marketing Board's Annual 
Report is different from potential export income as shown by 
the yearly level of output and the level of world market 
prices. The causes of this dissimilarity are discussed 
later in this section. 
3. One such Q.ase when some cotton bought from farmers was 
stollen from the Lint Marketing Board is documented in the 
1967 Lint Marketing Board Annual Report, p. 12. 
4. See 4, p. 340. 
5. For a justification of this choice. See 2, p. 15. 
6. See 9. 
7. The production function is assumed to be of the Neoclassical 
type. 
8. For the analytical and empirical exercises undertaken to 
derive the elasticity measure of 0.4 used in this analysis, 
See 3 
9. See 3, p. 21. 0.4412 is the mean of 0.6217, 0.4439, 0.0684 
and 0.6306, the long run sxipply elasticities estimated for 
the four regions of Uganda (i.e. Western, Eastern, Northern 
and Buganda). 
10. The Instability Index calculated is the same as used 
previously. 
- 19 -
REFERENCES 
1. Abbot, J.C. and Creupelandt, H.C. Agricultural Marketing Boards. 
Their Establishment and Operation. Marketing Guide No.5. 
Rome, F.A.O. 1965. 
2. Alibaruho, George, "The Impact of Marketing Board Policy on 
the Level and Variability of Cotton Producer Prices 
in Uganda; 1945-1969" Nairobi, Institute for Development 
Studies, Discussion Paper No. 199 March 1974. 
3. , "Regional Supply Elasticities in Uganda's Cotton 
Industry and the Disappearing Cotton Bales" Nairobi, 
Institute for Development Studies Working Paper No. 168, 
June 1974. 
4. Bauer, P.T. Dissent on Development: Studies .and. Debates in 
Development Economics. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1972. 
5. Brown, C.P. "The Malawi Farmers Marketing Board" Eastern Africa 
Economic Review 2(1) June 1970. 
6. Helleiner, Gerald. "Marketing Boards and Domestic Stabilisation 
in Nigeria" Economic Journal, 1966. 
7. International Cotton Advisory Committee. World Cotton Statistics. 
In International Cotton Advisory Committee. Reports 
Washington, D.C. 1950 - 1970. 
8. Lint Marketing Board. Annual Reports (various issues). Kampala. 
9. Mac Bean. Alesdair. Export Instability and Economic Development. 
London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966. 
10. Oury , Bernad. A Review of Past Efforts at Deriving 
Agricultural Supply Models for Developing Countries" 
Washington, D.C. World Bank W.P. 18 (mimeo) June 1968. 
11. Uganda. Ministry of Agriculture. Annual Reports, 1950, — , 1967. 
Entebbe : The Government Printer, 1950, — , 1967. 
12. United Nations. Instability ana Export Markets of Underdeveloped 
Countries (New York: United Nations, 1952) and also 
Trade and Economic Development (New York: United 
Nations, 19 53.). 
